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Abstract. Today in the scientific circle Humberto Romensin Maturana is considered the creator of the so-called Santiago School 
of Biology (also known as Biology of Cognition). Biology of Cognition is a research programme seeking an explanation of the phe-
nomenon of cognitive functions of living organisms through the concepts of self-organization (from dynamical systems theory) and 
structural coupling (from cybernetics).
Maturana’s novel view is based upon research conducted with such prominent scientists like Warren McCulloch, Francisco J. Varela 
or Heinz von Foerseter. After many years of study of complex organic systems the research resulted in formulation of the following 
theories: autopoiesis of living systems (with F. J. Varela) and the evolutionary metaphor of natural drift (with J. Mpodozis). Theory 
of autopoiesis (self-production) shows how organic cells organize themselves in producing inner organic self components needed for 
maintaining homeostatis, natural barriers and remaining cognitive at the molecular level. By contrast, the metaphor of natural drift can 
be understood as the history of diversification and adaptation of species in relation to many structural levels of the environment.
The following article constitutes a brief introduction to a critical way of thinking of the said Chilean theoretical biologist and phi-
losopher, established during his long-lasting research. The paper will outline the basic concepts and theoretical implications relevant 
to modern biological sciences, with particular emphasis on the classical theory of evolution.
Keywords: Santiago School of Biology, self-organization, principles of biological autonomy, structural coupling, enactive ap-
proach.
1. Introduction
In this paper I will be primarily discussing a certain way 
of thinking about biology and the use of metaphorical lan-
guage rather than the scientific jargon. I will discuss an 
unprecedented way in which the natural world can be seen 
by a scientist and a philosopher.
The purpose of this article is to present key concepts 
considering views of Humberto R. Maturana and his col-
leagues, bring closer the literature, outline the practical 
applications of their research thus presenting a different 
perspective on biology and the phenomenon of evolution, 
and ultimately determine whether it is an interesting view – 
its concepts and methodology. Specifically, I would like to 
discover misapplication of these concepts and take a glance 
at a different way of thinking about biology.
This paper won’t provide a full description of auto-
poiesis theory and natural drift metaphor, present all of 
their implications for human evolution, and finally con-
vince the reader that the ideas of the Santiago School of 
Biology pave the only right way of thinking about biology 
of complex organisms.
The article is divided into six sections. The first sec-
tion provides a brief historical overview, profiles of the 
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discussed scientists as well as the thematic literature. This 
section will contain a bibliographic guide for philosophers 
and biologists interested in the sciences of complexity, the 
theory of evolution and neurophysiology. The second sec-
tion defines the term of autopoiesis as a constituent of the 
natural drift metaphor. The third section introduces Vare-
la’s scientific view concerning the autonomy of biological 
systems. The fourth section discusses the concept of adap-
tation in the light of philosophical reflections of Maturana 
and his associates. The fifth section presents the metaphor 
of natural drift as a mature reflection on the concepts of 
adaptation and self-organization of living organisms in the 
context of evolutionary theory.
2. Main Part
This paper focuses not only on the scientific inquiries of 
Humberto Maturana, but also on creative thoughts of Fran-
cisco Varela and Jorge Mpodozis. All of the above-men-
tioned gentlemen are theoretical biologists by training, as 
well as specialists in the related fields (neurophysiology, 
immunology, etc.).
Humberto Maturana was born in 1928 in Chile. He 
first studied medicine there, later he began studying biol-
ogy at Harvard University in London (where he became 
known as an outstanding student of a philosopher and bi-
ologist – Ernst Mayr), and graduated in 1958. Until 1960 
he worked as a physiologist (Lettvin et al. 1959) at MIT at 
the laboratory of the Institute of Radio Engineering along 
with a cyberneticist Warren McCulloch. It was there that he 
made the interesting findings on vertebrate visual system 
(Boycott et al. 1965; Maturana et al. 1968). Since then he 
has lived in Chile. His specialty in biology is cognition. He 
is also known as a philosopher (Maturana 1990; Mingers 
1990). 
Francisco Varela was also born in Chile, in 1954. He 
studied biology and obtained his Ph.D. degree at the age of 
23 in Harvard, like Maturana. He fled from Chile in 1973 
for political reasons and since 1986 lived in Paris, where 
he tragically died in 2001. Varela was a student of Matu-
rana, and together they developed the ideas of autopoiesis, 
structural coupling and natural drift. He worked on many 
scientific projects including immunology (developing idi-
otypic network theory of Niels K. Jerne (Varela 1979, 
p. 238; Varela & Coutinho 1991; Detours et al. 1994), neu-
roscience (McMullin & Varela 1997; Varela 1997; Boden 
2000), psychotherapy (Varela 1989), etc.
Mpodozis replaced Varela after his tragic death. As an 
assistant he sought to develop new projects of his still ex-
tremely fertile teacher and mentor. His most famous article 
is The origin of species by means of natural drift written 
together with Maturana (2000) in which he fully develops 
the earlier presented idea of evolution seen as a natural 
drift (Maturana & Varela 1987, p. 93), or a historical float 
of structural couplings between organisms and the environ-
ment at the molecular level.
When speaking about the concept of natural drift I re-
fer to the metaphor relating to the reflection on the three 
basic concepts: a) autopoiesis, b) autonomy, c) adaptation. 
In 1975, Maturana released his first paper regarding the 
topic of Biology of Cognition (Maturana 1975), although 
he did not use the term autopoiesis in it. In 1979, a young 
student of Maturana, Francisco Varela, tried to formalize 
their thoughts by publishing the book titled Principles 
of Biological Autonomy, and so spread the ideas wider 
(Varela 1979). In 1980, the third well-known book was 
released, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of 
the living, published by both researchers. This book shows 
fully developed philosophical thoughts on the complexity 
of biological systems; their relations to the environment; 
and ways of their interaction and organization (Varela & 
Maturana 1980).
The mysterious term of natural drift was first intro-
duced in 1987 by both Maturana and Varela, in the book 
entitled The Tree of Knowledge: The Biological Roots of 
Human Understanding (1987). After many years of re-
search Maturana with his new assistant, Jorge Mpodozis, 
decided to further extend the idea of natural drift. In 1999 
they presented the paper: The origin of species by means of 
natural drift (Maturana & Mpodozis 2000) as an analogical 
and competitive way of thinking for neo-Darwinism. 
3. What is autopoiesis?
What exactly does the word autopoiesis mentioned at the 
beginning as a natural component of the theory of natu-
ral drift stand for? Autopoiesis in translation from Greek 
consists of two words: Αυτόσ = self, and Ποιειν = to 
produce. Autopoiesis means, as the translation above al-
ready implied, the continuous “self-producing” of a sys-
tem. It means, an organism consisting of many compo-
nents continuously recreates itself through its components. 
Every component creates (or takes part in a creation proc-
ess of) other components, which themselves create again 
other components and so on. In a living organism, this 
creation-process is closed, that means all components cre-
ate each other in a circular organization without help from 
the “outside”. As we can see the description must be given 
in mechanistic terms. Maturana and Varela state that “all 
living systems operate in a mechanistic way, so the defini-
tion must be purely mechanistic”, and so: “living systems 
are machines” (Varela & Maturana 1980, p. 77).
The word Autopoiesis appears in literature in two dif-
ferent ways: a) as a set of interconnected ideas aimed at 
providing the definition of life and explanations for bio-
logical phenomena (theory of autopoiesis), b) when ap-
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proaching this word more fundamentally, we speak about 
defining properties of living organisms.
The inspiration for this concept was provided from 
many fields: philosophers (for example: the Polish thinker 
Bronisław Trentowski or the French vitalist Herni Berg-
son), psychologists (Piaget, among many others), phenom-
enology (strong emphasis on the work of Merleau-Pon-
ti), and finally, cyberneticists (Glasersfeld and Foerster) 
(Zelezny 1997). 
While discussing autopoiesis we must first consider 
the two fundamental axioms. First, the axiom of struc-
tural determinism which assumes that life is not magic, 
but is defined through system dynamics depending only 
on structural composition – based on operational rights, 
specifically the laws of physics, with particular emphasis 
on the 1st and the 2nd law of thermodynamics (Mingers 
1995; Luisi 2006). The second axiom is manifested in the 
famous quotation “All that is said is said by an observer”. 
This axiom implies that a Scientist-Observer needs to take 
on a specific research attitude in relation to experiment 
and obtained knowledge. In the opinion of Santiago biolo-
gists the method of self-reflection is the only way to reach 
an objective image of reality and thus achieve the desired 
results (Varela & Maturana 1980, p. 8).
What, then, is life as a quintessential property of every 
living being? Life means having the ability of – and here 
we can open list: growth, reproduction, adaptation, me-
tabolism, autonomy, genetic heredity, self-organization, 
entropy reduction, self-modification (Luisi et al. 1996; 
Mingers 1989). This list shows that all these features are 
quite confusing and fuzzy. According to researchers from 
Santiago, we must first ask and answer the following ques-
tion: What exactly is this living organism? To solve this 
doubt, it is necessary to operationalize the concept of "life" 
(Fleischaker 1988). Therefore, the question must be refor-
mulated: What is the invariable feature of all living sys-
tems; referring to them at the present moment?
Reply: The fact that any biological system is always 
constituted (in the physical sense) in such a way as to 
remain separate from their physical environment. If this 
process is interrupted – that system dies. Autopoiesis is 
a system, and therefore alive.
In summary, every autopoietic system consists of: i) 
organization (set of all relations between components that 
build a unity of a particular class); ii) structure (set of all 
relations in an actual system that build this system). All 
components take part in continuous producing themselves 
(circular organization), and one or more components define 
a border of the system, so that the system is a single unity 
(structure) (Fleischaker 1988, p. 132; Varela 1979, p. 15; 
Varela & Maturana 1980, p. 88).
How to prove the rightness of the Santiago theory 
of self-organization? According to Maturana and others 
(Varela 1979, p. 19; Varela & Maturana 1980, p. 90) – the 
simplest way to verify the correctness of autopoietic theory 
is to focus on the simple model. Physical embodiment of 
Maturana and Varela definition of a living system can be 
seen in a descriptive model of eukaryotic cell (Fleischaker 
1988, p. 141; Luisi & Varela 1989; Luisi 2002). The cell 
creates continuously its own components (nucleus, mito-
chondria, ribosome, membrane, etc.). The membrane sepa-
rates the inner parts of the cell from the outside, covers all 
of the cell. All components have electrochemical proper-
ties, follow general physical laws and interact with each 
other. The membrane is built from inside the cell and does 
determine the “end” of the cell in any direction by itself 
and is created and continuously reproduced by the other 
components in the cell.
Today the theory of autopoiesis is regarded as the cor-
nerstone of Biology of Cognition. Application of the theo-
retical assumptions of Maturana and Varela (autopoietic 
methodology) leads to multi-disciplinary research pro-
gramme, that can be clarified by means of several key 
concepts (closer or further related to the concept of au-
topoiesis):
– evolution seen as progress – it is not necessary, because 
every living organism is considered as a autopoietic 
system which is based on its structurally conditioned 
skills and abilities (Lewontin 1983a; Maturana & Mpo-
dozis 2000; Mingers 1995),
– natural selection is a consequence of evolution, not its 
cause (Maturana & Varela 1987; Kauffman 1993; Vare-
la 1979), 
– life cannot exist without physical limitations – for ex-
ample: a cell cannot exist without its boundaries (Fleis-
chaker 1988; Zeleny 1997),
– genotype does not determine phenotype (Lewontin 
1983a; Maturana & Mpodozis 2000), 
– an organism cannot exist without the environment, and 
the environment without a body (Boden 2000; Luisi 
2002; Mingers J., 1990; Zeleny 1977),
– the mind is not in the head, the brain is not a computer 
– for example: people can extend their cognitive abili-
ties onto artifacts (Maturana 1985), 
– cognition equals life – living complex organisms can-
not exist without cognitive abilities (Luisi et al. 1996; 
Varela & Maturana 1980),
– the nervous system is not processing information 
(Boycott et al. 1965; Lettvin 1959; Varela & Maturana 
1980),
– the internal representations (notion from philosophy of 
mind) are a category mistake (Maturana 1990),
– communication is not a transfer of information (Kin-
caid 1987; Krippendorff 1987; Luhmann 1986),
– artificial life is possible from a logical point of view if, 
and when, it is embodied and metabolized (Varela & 
Bourgine 1991).
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4. Francisco Varela’s definition  
of biological autonomy
The concept of biological autonomy in philosophical view 
of Francisco Varela is extended to organisms with a greater 
degree of complexity, with isolated sub-modules shaped on 
the principle of recursive generation of network changes. 
An example of autonomous beings are all these organisms 
that are built from autopoietic units (for example: organic 
cells); that have minimal signs of the nervous or immune 
system (Varela 1979, p. 211; Varela & Maturana 1980, 
p. 15; Varela 1997).
The theory of autopoiesis places the notion of autono-
my at the center of the biological understanding of all liv-
ing beings (Varela 1979, p. 41; Varela & Maturana 1980, 
p. 85). Autonomy means self-law, being in charge. In gen-
eral, this is understood either as the capacity to: a) act ac-
cording to self-determined principles, b) or as the duty of 
recognizing and respecting that aptitude about someone. In 
an ontological usage it may also mean that a given level or 
realm is relatively independent with respect to others be-
cause it is ruled by its own norms. According to Maturana 
and Varela’s theory of autopoiesis, autonomous capaci-
ties stem from self-production and they constitute a liv-
ing entity (Fleischaker 1988; Kauffman 1993; Varela 1979, 
p. 55). In short: autopoiesis is the mechanism that imparts 
autonomy to the living.
5. Criteria of adaptation
Adaptation is a one of a kind ability that characterizes all 
living organisms; it is one of the highest forms of behav-
ior. In the view of Maturana and others (Fleischaker 1988, 
p. 135) it is equated with the ability to keep being alive 
– being autopoietic, maintaining open structure: receive 
“impulses” from the environment and react adequately, and 
finally preserve the unique organization by organizational 
closure (keep boundaries, and so the identity) (Varela 1979, 
p. 8; Varela & Maturana 1980). The process of evolution 
is a valid expression of ontogeny, of the unique character-
istics of certain species acquired by phylogeny (ancestral 
development). In literature, researchers sometimes refer to 
adaptation as a form of mutualism.
In the opinion of Maturana and others (Varela 1979, 
p. 24; Varela & Maturana 1980), if we look at any autopoi-
etic system through the categories of an organizational 
homeostasis, we may be able to see many adaptive criteria. 
Living system is organized as a network of processes of 
assembly, transformation, and destruction of components. 
In this evolutionary, long-established way of interaction – 
every living organism regenerates and optimizes its states 
(inner relations) for maintaining its identity (unique ontog-
eny). The second interesting feature is the fact, that living 
systems are constituted of / constitute a specific topological 
space – are created by / create environment.
Summarizing the discussion on the definition of life 
(or being alive) – what are the criteria for showing that 
the system is alive or artificial, thus adaptive or passive? 
There are six gradual criteria formalized by Varela, us-
ing the George Spencer Brown’s calculus of indications 
(Varela 1979). If you answer “yes” to all of the follow-
ing questions you will deal with an autopoietic adaptive 
system: a) Has the unity identifiable boundaries? b) Does 
the unity consist of components and do these components 
constitute the unity? c) Is the unity a mechanistic system, 
that is, do the components have relations to and do they 
interact with each other? d) Do the components that build 
the boundaries of the unity do that by themselves, that is, 
don’t you as the observer determine the boundaries? e) Are 
the components that build the boundaries produced by the 
other components and do they take part in the whole pro-
ducing process? f) Are all other components also produced 
by each other and take part in the whole producing proc-
ess? (Varela 1979, p. 55).
As we can see, being adaptive is to maintain closed 
operational organization (type of class), with dynamically 
open structure that can preserve its identity in relation to 
changing environment, etc. (Varela 1979, p. 24).
In the context of defining criteria of adaptation in liv-
ing organisms, the phenomena concerned with social be-
havior are also very important (Dell 1985; Foerster 1973; 
Maturana 1995). According to Maturana and others, so-
cial structures – are the result of biological organization, 
biological forms based on the structural coupling between 
systems and their surroundings: engaging in interactions, 
coordination and developing structural suitability (or con-
servative adequate behavioral schemes).
6. The natural drift metaphor
According to Maturana and others, in order to characterize 
all the phenomena of the natural world there is a need of 
a good definition of life, autonomy, adaptation. The meta-
phor of the natural drift (Maturana & Varela 1987; Mat-
urana & Mpodozis 2000; Camus 2000) brought together 
all the ideas of biologists from Santiago and is seeking 
a broader – holistic – way to characterize the concept of 
evolution, while still retaining the two axioms previously 
posed (axiom of structural determinism; and self-referring 
observer). The proposition of Maturana and others (2000; 
Lewontin 1991) in many points agrees with the concept 
of life characterized by Lynn Margulis and others (Luisi 
2006). 
What is natural drift and how does it characterize ev-
olution? Since the dynamics of the environment may be 
erratic, the result in terms of evolution is a natural drift, 
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determined primarily by the inner coherence and autonomy 
of the living organism. In this sense, Maturana and Varela’s 
view (Maturana & Varela 1980, 1986) is close to Gantis’s 
(1975, 2003) theory of chemotons or Prigogine’s theory of 
changes in dissipative structures (Kauffman 1993). Evolu-
tion does not pursue any particular aim – it simply drifts. 
The path it chooses is not, however, completely random, 
but is one of many that are in harmony with the inner struc-
ture of the autopoietic unit. These coupled interactions, ac-
cumulated over time, give a particular historical perspec-
tive to the autopoietic system. It becomes a historical prod-
uct, the result of a long series of coupled interactions.
Evolution is not progress, it is simply drift. Natural drift 
is a dynamical mechanism (at structural level) that gave 
rise to the diversity of living systems that we find today, 
as well as to the biosphere as a coherent system of inter-
related autonomous living systems. Natural drift refers to 
the history of living systems on earth, that is the history 
of the arising, conservation, and diversification of lineages 
through reproduction, and not of populations (Maturana & 
Varela 1987; Lewontin 1991).
Maturana and others are saying that biological repro-
duction is a systemic process of conservation of a particu-
lar ontogenic-phenotype / ontogenic-niche relation, and not 
a genetic process of conservation of some genetic constitu-
tion (particular genotype) (Rozzi et al. 1988).
Although nothing can happen in the life history of a liv-
ing system that is not permitted by its total genotype, what-
ever happens in it arises in an epigenetic manner, and it is 
not possible to properly claim that any feature that arises 
in the life history of an organism is genetically determined 
(Maturana & Varela 1987, p. 99; Maturana & Mpodozis 
2000). At many points Maturana and others argue that be-
havior guides the course of the history of living systems, 
not genetics. Santiago Biologists are basically saying that 
it is not the genes that reflect evolutionary changes, but the 
gene-environment interactions.
Lewontin (1991, p. 101) mentions that the atmosphere 
that we all breathe was not on earth before living organ-
isms and adds:
“(…) there is no “environment” in some independent 
and abstract sense. Just as there is no organism without an 
environment, there is no environment without an organism. 
Organisms do not experience environments. They create 
them. They construct their own environments out of the 
bits and pieces of the physical and biological world, and 
they do so by their own activities.”
What are the essential differences between the theory 
of Maturana and the followers of neo-Darwinism? In the 
case of natural drift an evolutional unit is a self-organizing 
network set-up (autopoietic system). Structural coupling 
is a mechanism of selection, and refers to the recognition 
that a system’s structural relationship with its environment 
will determine its responses to disturbances or triggers. So 
it occurs on both sides (of the organism and the environ-
ment). Organism and environment mutually determine 
each other through a set of historical networks, so that they 
cannot exist without each other (Lewontin 1983b; Varela 
& Maturana 1987, p. 86).
By contrast, the neo-Darwinian view at evolutional 
unit consists of a whole population of genes whose form 
is focused on heredity, mutations, etc. The selection is un-
derstood by the concept of adaptation (adaptation of the 
organism to the environment), there are good and unique 
structures that are adapting to solve problems. The envi-
ronment is supreme, independent of the organisms, is the 
"selector" for organisms, where the organism through ran-
dom genes adopts to the environment in a successful or 
unsuccessful way (Lewontin 1983a; Varela 1979, p. 30; 
Varela & Maturana 1980, p. 102).
The interaction between organisms and their environ-
ment is a part of a more general scenario of ecology (Matu-
rana & Varela 1987, p. 112). It has been in fact stated that 
living organisms make and continuously change the envi-
ronment in which they live, and vice versa, so that every 
act of consumption is also an act of production; also, that 
we must forget the idea that there is a constant and fixed 
world – as we are constantly changing it and cannot live 
without changing it. (Lewontin 1991). From that stems the 
difficulty of finding a healthy equilibrium that preserves as 
much as possible the identity of the living (Oyama 2000, 
p. 142).
7. Conclusion
In conclusion – organisms are historical systems, construct-
ed in a circular way (closed organizationally, structurally 
open). By contrast, evolution is a complicated network of 
interactions at the level of ontogenetic plasticity of the spe-
cies, etc. Thus, I put forward the question: Is autopoiesis 
with the metaphor of the natural drift a scientific theory? 
Not entirely, it should be taken as a way of using specific 
language with particular terms, rather than as a scientific 
theory in the strict sense and not even like in the classical 
philosophy of biology (Camus 2000).
What is its value? It is certainly a very complicated the-
ory, logically coherent, leaning on complicated language. 
This theory is not false, or verifiable. Transferring it to 
another scientific discipline, it appears to be more or less 
adequate in a particular field of research.
Is it worth today investigating the thought of the Chile-
an biologists? In my humble opinion – it is. Drifting among 
many of their ideas, expressed in difficult and hermeneuti-
cal-like language is challenging. I can certainly guaran-
tee that the researcher-reader will be provided with a new 
perspective on the world of biology and interdisciplinary 
sciences.
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